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Abstract
A group signature scheme allows group members to issue signatures on behalf of the group, while hiding for each signature which
group member actually issued it. Such scheme also involves a group manager, who is able to open any group signature by showing
which group member issued it.
We introduce the concept of list signatures as a variant of group signatures which sets a limit on the number of signatures
each group member may issue. These limits must be enforced without having the group manager open signatures of honest group
members—which excludes the trivial solution in which the group manager opens every signature to see whether some group
members exceed their limits. Furthermore, we consider the problem of publicly identifying group members who exceed their limits,
also without involving the group manager.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The basic functionality of a group signature scheme, as introduced byChaum andVanHeyst [20], is to allowmembers
of a group to issue signatures on behalf of the group, while hiding for each signature which group member actually
issued it. In addition it must be possible for a group manager to open any signature issued on behalf of the group, by
showing which member issued it.
The group manager is therefore in a powerful position and must be trusted not to revoke the anonymity of group
members without permission. To lower the trust in the group manager it may be implemented in a distributed fashion
(using threshold cryptography) such that signatures are only opened if a majority of the proxies (or, shareholders)
agrees to do so.
In this paper, we study methods to extend the functionality of group signatures while limiting the involvement of the
group manager as much as possible. We introduce the notion of public detection, which in its simplest form enables
any party to detect if a group member attempts to issue more than one signature on behalf of the group. Obviously, this
problem can be solved by having the group manager open every signature to check whether a group member signed
twice. In that case, however, all signatures by honest group members are also opened. Loosely speaking, we deﬁne a
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list signature scheme as a group signature scheme with public detection, without using a group manager’s private key
for this purpose. To prevent the need to continuously rekey the scheme, we let signatures depend on a time frame and
only require detection of signatures of the same user within the same time frame (and unlinkability otherwise).1
We also introduce the notion of list signatures with public identiﬁcation. This type of scheme not only allows any
party to detect dishonest group members, but also for any party to identify them based on their signatures issued on
behalf of the group. Hence, the absence of a group manager who can identify misbehaving participants does not actually
help them in trying not to be identiﬁed. This is particularly useful in an on-line/off-line scenario, where signatures are
veriﬁed on-line but only checked for double occurrences later.
Group signatures are sometimes associated with applications such as electronic cash and electronic voting. In these
applications, a central problem is to prevent payers from spending the same coin twice and voters from casting more
than one ballot, respectively. Group signature schemes with public detection substantiate these claims by building in a
mechanism to detect multiple signatures by the same groupmember.As explained above, we require that the scheme can
be run in an optimistic mode: signatures of honest group members need not be opened; however, if multiple signatures
by the same group member are detected, the group manager may reveal the identity by opening one of these signatures.
There are several constructions known in the literature that are related to group signatures, such as identity-escrow,
anonymous credentials, concurrent signatures, ring signatures, traceable signatures, and direct anonymous attestation.
We brieﬂy discuss the latter three, since they are most relevant to our new proposal of list signatures.
Ring signatures were introduced by Rivest et al. [29] as a light-weight alternative to group signatures. The important
feature of a ring signature is the fact that groups aremade ad-hocwithout the intervention of a groupmanager by distilling
a group public key from the public keys of the intended group members. Ring signatures as originally proposed do not
include amanager to open signatures. Recent work byDodis et al. [23] shows that ring signatures can in fact be equipped
with an opening mechanism, in which case they become group signatures with vastly simpliﬁed group management.
Obviously for list signatures a distinction can also be made between different types of group management.
Traceable signatures were introduced by Kiayias et al. [25]. They offer the same functionality as group signatures,
but with two added possibilities called tracing and claiming. It is relatively straightforward for a signer to claim
ownership of a signature as long as the signer knows the randomness used to create its signature (and note that, contrary
to ordinary signatures, group signatures necessarily need to be randomised since they include an encryption of the
identity). Kiayias et al. consider the situation where a signer can claim a signature originated from it without needing
to know the randomness. Tracing a signature allows the group manager to publish a value that allows the tracing of all
signatures originating from a speciﬁc signer.
Direct anonymous attestation was recently introduced by Brickell et al. [11]. It is slightly different from the schemes
above, in that the user is actually split in two parts: a trusted platform module (TPM) and a host (for instance a mobile
phone). If we ignore this separation, direct anonymous attestation can be seen as a group signature without the feature
that a signature can be opened, but with the added functionality that signatures originating from the same user can be
made linkable.
Roadmap: In Section 2, some notation is introduced, followed by a brief and informal discussion of the relevant
intractability assumptions. Our ﬁrst result is presented in Section 3, where we show how to efﬁciently prove equality of
discrete logarithms in a 1-out-of-N setting. In Section 4, we give a deﬁnition of what constitutes a list signature scheme
and, after introducing the basic design ideas in Section 5, we present a list signature scheme suitable for small groups
(of users) in Section 6 and one for large groups in Section 7. We conclude with some remarks about the applicability
of list signatures to electronic voting schemes in Section 8.
2. Intractability assumptions
Strong RSA Assumption. Letp′ and q ′ be distinct primes of equal bit length, such that bothp=2p′+1 and q=2q ′+1
are also prime. In this case, the number n = pq is called a safe RSA modulus. The multiplicative group of quadratic
residues modulo n is denoted by QR(n), which is a cyclic group of order p′q ′.
1 More generally, one may think of “time frames” as “labels” (or, “tags”) and each user may issue at most one signature per label.
S. Canard et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 154 (2006) 189–201 191
The ﬂexible RSA problem is deﬁned as ﬁnding a u ∈ QR(n) and an integer e, e > 1, such that ue = y mod n, for
given y and n. Solving the ﬂexible RSA problem is easy if one knows the prime factorisation of n. The strong RSA
assumption states that given only y and n, the ﬂexible RSA problem is hard to solve.
Decision Difﬁe–Hellman Assumption. Let G be a ﬁnite cyclic group, and let g denote a generator of G. The decision
Difﬁe–Hellman (DDH) assumption for group G states that it is hard to solve the DDH problem, i.e., to distinguish
so-called Difﬁe–Hellman triples (gx, gy, gxy) from random triples (gx, gy, gz), for random x, y, z modulo the order
of group G.
More generally, theDDHproblemmay also be formulated for arbitrary ﬁnite abelian groups,which are not necessarily
cyclic. In particular, if G = QR(n), then G has composite order and for those knowing the group decomposition of
G (i.e., knowing the prime factorisation of n), the DDH problem in G reduces to the DDH problem in the respective
components of G. That is, the DDH problem in G is hard if and only if it is hard in all of its components, which is the
case, e.g., if n is a safe 2048-bit RSA modulus, as we will use further on in this paper.
3. Proving subset relations for sets of discrete logs
Let Gq be a group of prime order q. Suppose f and g are generators of Gq such that logg f is unknown.We present an
efﬁcient zero-knowledge proof ofmembership for the language consisting of tuples (a1, . . . , aM, y1, . . . , yN) ∈ GM+Nq ,
1MN , satisfying
{logf aj | 1jM} ⊆ {logg yi | 1 iN}.
We note that for our applications we only need the case M = 1.
Before doing so, let us give a quick reminder of the tools we need. Knowledge of a discrete logarithm can be proved
using Schnorr’s protocol [30]. For the remainder of this section, we use the work for a Schnorr proof as our unit of
work (that is, the work to either generate a Schnorr proof, or to verify a Schnorr proof, or to compute an honest-veriﬁer
simulation of a Schnorr proof is taken as one unit of work). Chaum and Pedersen [19] proposed an extension to prove
equality (and knowledge) of discrete logarithms; the work for such a proof of equality amounts to the work of two
Schnorr proofs. Finally, Cramer et al. [21] have given a technique to prove that 1-out-of-N statements holds, without
revealing which statement actually holds (in fact, their technique is more general). The work for such a proof is roughly
equal to N times the work for proving a single statement.
We now return to a proof for the languagewe described. IfM=N=1 the language coincides with the language for the
Chaum–Pedersen proof mentioned above. For the general case, it is possible to directly apply the technique for proving
1-out-of-N relations using the Chaum–Pedersen proof as the basic proof to show that logf aj ∈ {logg yi | 1 iN},
for j = 1, . . . ,M . Indeed this is the approach followed by Camenisch [13] and Cramer et al. [22] to construct proofs
for similar statements. However, the total work for the proof becomes approximately 2MN times the work for a Schnorr
proof.
We obtain an improved protocol by breaking up the proof in a different way. As a result we are able the reduce the
total work roughly by a factor of two, reducing it from 2MN to MN + M + N times the work of a Schnorr proof.
The protocol is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose logg f is unknown. If one knows witnesses u1, . . . , uM , v1, . . . , vN , and w1, . . . , wM satisfying
aj = f uj for all j = 1, . . . ,M , (1)
yi = gvi for all i = 1, . . . , N , (2)
∃Ni=1ajyi = (fg)wj for all j = 1, . . . ,M (3)
then
{logf aj | 1jM} ⊆ {logg yi | 1 iN}. (4)
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Proof. Consider any j, 1jM . Let i, 1 iN , be such that ajyi = (fg)wj , for witness wj . Then also f uj gvi =
(fg)wj , for witnesses uj and vi . This implies that one may compute logg f as
logg f = (vi − wj)/(wj − uj ),
unless uj = vi = wj . Since we assume that logg f is unknown, (4) must hold. 
Therefore, in order to prove that (4) holds, it sufﬁces to prove that (1)–(3) hold. For (1) and (2) we need M and N
Schnorr proofs, respectively. Statement (3) can be proved using the technique for proving 1-out-of-N relations, requiring
the work of MN Schnorr proofs.
We will apply Lemma 1 in Section 6 to obtain an efﬁcient signing algorithm for our list signature scheme, where we
take advantage of the fact that the N proofs for (2) have already been given at an earlier stage. Lemma 1 can also be
used to speed up Camenisch’ group signature scheme [13] or multiway elections [22] by a factor of two.
4. List signatures: deﬁnition
We now move to a new type of signature scheme, which has as deﬁning feature that signatures within a certain time
frame are linkable. More precisely, if a single user signs twice within the same time frame, the two signatures can be
efﬁciently linked. Signatures of the same user in different time frames remain unlinkable though. A stronger version
allows public retrieval of the identities of users who sign twice within a time frame without the intervention of a group
manager. Because we regard double-signing as bad behaviour, we only deﬁne a minimum penalty (either detection or
identiﬁcation). We do not require that the damage stops there, it might very well be that double-signing in fact results
in full traceability of that user’s signatures or even the ability of anyone to sign on that user’s behalf. Needless to say, it
is possible to pinpoint the penalty of double-signing more precisely (note that in the real/ideal-model this is achieved
automatically [11]).
With respect to group management, we opt for a slightly less traditional approach. First of all, we assume that there
is already a legally binding PKI in place which enables users to identify themselves in a committing way. Secondly we
assume that any group public key also implicitly deﬁnes the qualiﬁed group members under that key. This assumption
makes it easier to deﬁne security for dynamic groups (either ad hoc schemes or schemes allowing revocation). Even for
schemes that claim a constant size group key, such as the one byAteniese et al. [2] the public key satisﬁes this property
if the transcripts of the Join-protocols are regarded as part of the public key. As noted by Dodis et al. [23] it is not so
much the size of the theoretical group public key that matters, but rather the information that is actually needed to sign
and verify signatures (assuming that it has already been checked that this information is part of a valid and relevant
group public key).
For our deﬁnition of list signatures we extend the existing model for group signatures (see [20,13]) with protocols
for detection and identiﬁcation and taking into account some recent developments regarding the deﬁnition of group
signatures [26,6,5] and the discussion above.
A list signature scheme involves various entities: a group managerM who is responsible for the group’s public key
and users i who will be group members. A list signature scheme thus comprises protocols for the following tasks:
Key generationwhich produces the group’s public key used to verify signatures, a private key for each groupmember,
and a private key for the group manager. Typically key generation consists of a Setup protocol to initialise the system
that will output the private key of the group manager and some related public information; an interactive Join protocol
between a user i and the group manager after which the user becomes a member of the group, legally bound by its
own signature using an existing PKI; a Revoke protocol that the group manager can use to revoke a member; and an
Update protocol that group users can use to update their private key after a change in the public key as a consequence
of another user joining or leaving the qualiﬁed group of members.
Sign to produce a signature on input of a message, a time frame, the group’s public key, and a group member’s private
key.
Verify which takes as input a message, a time frame, a signature and the group’s public key and accepts if and only
if the signature is valid for that message and time frame.
Open which is used by the group manager to prove that a group member did or did not produce a signature.
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Match to determine whether out of a list of signatures based on the same time frame two (or, in general, k) signatures
were produced by the same person (called detection procedure) and, for schemes with identiﬁcation, by whom.
Note that a scheme with opening but without detection or identiﬁcation is the traditional group signature scheme.
A scheme with detection or identiﬁcation but not necessarily with the capability of opening is called a list signature
scheme.
Below, we consider three security properties: correctness, soundness, and anonymity. For soundness we make a
distinction between group signatures, list signatures and the combination of both. We only describe the properties
informally and do not precisely state the capabilities of the adversary. In a formalisation, the adversary will typically
be modelled as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine run on input 1 (for a security parameter ) that is
allowed to introduce honest and corrupt users to the system, corrupt honest players, have honest players revoked, ask
honest players for signatures and, if applicable, ask for signatures to be opened.
The only limitations we pose on the adversary are that it can only query one signature per honest user per time frame
and it cannot ask for opening a challenge signature (in the anonymity game). We are also cautious about allowing
corruption of the group manager, especially since the group manager can be split according to functionality (e.g., into
a manager for joining and a manager for revocation). In the schemes presented below we will be more concrete about
the level of corruption that the scheme can cope with.
Correctness: Firstly, an adversary cannot prevent honest group members from producing valid signatures, and,
secondly, an adversary cannot cause the detection of the signatures of an honest group member.
Soundness: An adversary can produce at most one valid signature per time frame per corrupted player without being
detected, or without the identity of a corrupted group member being released. Note that signatures obtained from
querying honest signers do not count as produced by the adversary. (If applicable, an adversary cannot produce a valid
signature that does not open to a corrupted player.)
Anonymity: Given a set of signatures over different time frames, the adversary cannot determine whether two of them
were produced by the same person.
Note that in the case of identiﬁcation the second clause of correctness is superﬂuous.An adversary capable of causing
identiﬁcation of honest users already breaches anonymity.
Thedetectability feature of list signature schemes automatically implies that theoretically groupmembers candisavow
or claim a signature without the need to know the randomness that created it, based on the well-known result that all
of NP can be proven in zero-knowledge. As pointed out by Camenisch [15], this has the side-effect that a coalition
encompassing all users but one, can prove that a signature originated from the last remaining honest user. In ordinary
group signature schemes, this should not be possible.
5. Basic ideas for realizing list signature schemes
In this section, we informally describe how to adapt group signature schemes into list signature schemes. We
will concentrate on detectability, since getting rid of the opening facility of group signatures, if required, is usually
relatively straightforward. In the literature two important types of group signatures exist, those whose efﬁciency is
(largely) independent of the group size and those for which this is not the case, typically resulting in linear dependency
on the group size. Interestingly, most large group signature schemes are based on the Strong RSA assumption coupled
with (a version of) the DDH assumption. Small group signature schemes can be easily implemented based on groups
in which the DDH problem is assumed hard.
Let us deﬁne some notation and terminology. We let G be a group of possibly unknown order in which the DDH
problem is assumed to be hard, even if the group decomposition of G is known. We also assume the existence of a hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → G. Furthermore, we observe that in all group signature schemes we are aware that each user
has a unique private exponent xi , not necessarily reduced modulo the group order.
5.1. Detection
The basic idea for performing detection is simple. Given the description of a time frame T, the user computes and
publishes H(T )xi , along with a NIZK-proof that the same private key was used for the computation of H(T )xi and the
rest of the signature. Note that most, if not all, known constructions of group signatures already employ a NIZK-proof
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involving xi during the signing state and that adapting these proofs can always be done theoretically and quite efﬁciently
in practice (which will become clear from our examples).
It is intuitively clear that an otherwise honest signer who signs twice in the same time frame will be caught since the
values of H(T )xi will collide in these two signatures. On the other hand, it is extremely unlikely that the signatures of
two honest users cause detection. In fact, it will also be hard for an adversary to cause detection based on an honest
user’s signature and one of its own signatures, since the proof of knowledge that is part of any valid signature requires
the adversary to actually know a value x congruent to the private key xi of the honest user (modulo the group order).
Of course, private keys are supposed to be well protected from an adversary.
Linking signatures of the same user, but within different time frames will be difﬁcult. Loosely speaking, the proof of
knowledgewill not aid an adversary in linking signatures since it is aNIZK-proof. Furthermore, the valueH(T )xi can be
regarded to be independent of the rest of the signature if H is modelled as a random oracle. Here we use the fact that the
rest of the signature is based on a group signature scheme where time frames are not deﬁned, soHwill not be queried on
T in that part of the signature. Moreover, if the original group signature scheme was secure, that part of the list signature
will not give the signer away.All that remains are the valuesH(T )xi for a ﬁxed xi but variousT. Under the random oracle
model, the elements output by H are uncorrelated or, more precisely, even for an adversary who can adaptively choose
the values Tj the distribution H(Tj )j=1,...,m will be indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over Gm, provided
all the Tj are different. But then the DDH assumption will guarantee that the distribution (H(Tj ),H(Tj )x)j=1,...,m
where x is a randomly chosen exponent, is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over G2m,
since it is well known that the hardness of the DDH problem based on quadruples implies the hardness of the DDH
problem based on any 2m-tuple as long as m is polynomial in the security parameter.
The idea of detection using exponentiation with a random but public group element as base and a power related
to a private key also appears in the context of for instance toggling schemes [31], fair E-cash systems [32,18], di-
rect anonymous attestation [11] and traceable signatures [25]. We note that it can be advantageous to use a dif-
ferent group than G for detection (cf. [11]) to improve the efﬁciency or to ease the implementation of
identiﬁcation.
5.2. Identiﬁcation
A list signature scheme providing detection can also be extended to provide identiﬁcation of dishonest groupmembers
using techniques based on secret sharing. For convenience, assume that the group G is of large prime order q.
The easiest 2-out-of-q threshold sharing schemes for Zq that exists is one based on lines. Let s ∈ Zq be a secret,
then the dealer picks a random point r ∈ Zq and hands out shares (X, r + sX) ∈ Z2q , i.e., points on a line. Given one
point the slope s is still information theoretically hidden, but clearly two points (or, shares) deﬁne the line and allow
retrieval of the line.
A list signature scheme can be equipped with the identiﬁcation functionality by requiring that, as part of a list
signature, the user releases a point on a line that contains its identity. Obviously a user should not be allowed to use
the same point twice, but this can easily by ensured by using a hash of the message to be signed. A problem though is
that signatures in different time frames should not reveal anything, which basically requires a fresh line for each time
frame. This technicality can be overcome by exploiting the linearity of the secret sharing scheme and conducting the
secret sharing scheme on the exponents in Zq , handing out shares (X, gr+sX) instead. The secret s will remain the
same, but the randomness r will depend both on the time frame and the identity of the user (basically by performing
Difﬁe–Hellman key agreement in some sense). Although only gs can be reconstructed this way, identiﬁcation of the
user is ensured.
6. Small groups
In this section, we describe how the construction outlined above can be accomplished using standard discrete
logarithm based tools and the technique of Section 3, to form a list signature with identiﬁcation capability. The scheme
is actually of the ad hoc type, meaning that the group of members belonging to a public key only need to be determined
at the time of signing.
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Setup: The group manager picks a group Gq of prime order q and publishes (Gq, q), together with two randomly
chosen generators g and h of Gq . The decision Difﬁe–Hellman problem is assumed to be hard in the group Gq . Further,
cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Gq and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → Zq are deﬁned.
Note that the group manager does not have a private key and is not involved in the remainder of the list signature
scheme.
Join: A user joins by picking a random x ∈ Zq and publishing y = gx , together with a non-interactive proof of
knowledge of x. Henceforth we will assume that user i is legally bound to its public key yi and we denote xi = logg yi .
To sign anonymously on behalf of a group of users, the group public key is computed as the concatenation of the
public keys of the individual members.
Sign: Let (y1, . . . , yN) be a group public key and let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. User i wishing to sign a message m in time
frame T ﬁrst computes t = H(T ), s = H(T, 1) and X = H ′(m, T ). It then publishes values T1 = txi and T2 = sxi yXi
together with a non-interactive proof of knowledge that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} it holds that the user knows an x ∈ Zq
such that yi =gx, T1 = tx , and T2 = (sgX)x without revealing x nor i. Here the technique developed in Section 3 can be
employed to save work. The user applies a Chaum–Pedersen proof of knowledge of logt T1 = logsgX T2 and performs
a 1-out-of-N proof of knowledge of logtg T1yi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Verify: Verify that the public key is correct, i.e., only consists of values resulting from the Join protocol, and verify
the non-interactive proof included in the signature.
Match: If two signatures (T1, T2) on message m and (T ′1, T ′2) on message m′ based on the same time frame T satisfy
T1 = T ′1 compute y = (T2/T ′2)1/(X−X
′)
, where X =H ′(m, T ) and X′ =H ′(m′, T ). Identify the double-signer as user i
with y = yi .
6.1. Security
Our claim is that the above scheme is secure in the Random Oracle model under the DDH assumption. Since the
group manager is only involved in Setup, it may be totally corrupted, provided it cannot introduce a somehow weak
group Gq during key generation.
Correctness: We ﬁrst remark that we only have to contend ourselves with the ﬁrst clause, since we are dealing with a
scheme with identiﬁcation. The ﬁrst clause is trivially satisﬁed, since an honest user will only ever commit to a public
key y for which it knows logg y.
Soundness: This follows from the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof used in the signing algorithm and the fact
that, under anonymity, the adversary cannot know the private keys of honest users.
Anonymity: This boils down to a straightforward reduction to the DDH assumption.
6.2. Efﬁciency
Just to give a ﬂavour of the efﬁciency of the scheme above, suppose it is implemented based on an elliptic curve
group with log2 q ≈ 160. In that case a single user’s public key consists of one point on the elliptic curve, taking
about 160 bits in total (using standard point compression techniques). The public key of a group of N members will be
approximately 160N bits long. A signature takes 320 bits for publishing T1 and T2 plus approximately an additional
320 bits per group member for the proof of knowledge, i.e., a grand total of 320(N + 1) bits for a signature.
7. Large groups
Our proposal is based on the group signature scheme of Ateniese et al. [2]. In a nutshell, each user is issued with a
triple (A, e, x) such that Ae = axa0 mod n, where n is a safe RSA modulus, see Section 2. The pair (A, e) is public and
linked to the identity of the user, the value x is its private key. A signature is basically a proof of knowledge of such a
pair, made non-interactively using the Fiat–Shamir heuristic (this is also where the message to be signed is used). Note
that it is also possible to design a list signature scheme from the group signature scheme of Camenisch and Groth [16]
that is an improvement of the Ateniese et al. scheme.
The scheme still needs a revocation scheme to be complete. Various revocation principles have been proposed
[3,10,17,27], but [3,10] are not efﬁcient enough and [27] is broken.Wewill use the result byCamenisch andLysyanskaya
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[17] based on earlier work by Baric´ and Pﬁtzmann [4]. Basically, a revocation manager publishes u and v such that
v = u
∏
i ei over all group members i. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya ﬁx a value for u and, by changing v, users are added
or removed from the qualiﬁed group. To determine the qualiﬁed group, two sets are maintained, Eadd and Edel. The set
of qualiﬁed users is precisely the set Equal = Eadd\Edel and the public key should at any time satisfy v = u
∏
ei∈Equal ei
(if the public key is corrupt, we will by deﬁnition assume that no user is qualiﬁed).
Clearly qualiﬁed userswill be able to prove knowledge of an eth root of v with a correspondingmembership certiﬁcate
by computing B = u(
∏
ei∈Equal ei )/e, for e ∈ Equal. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya however do not publish u and show that
in fact the scheme can be made more efﬁcient: users only need to update their “root” when other users are added or
deleted and this update is linear in the number of modiﬁcations, but independent of the number of users that do not
change status.
We claim that publishing u is beneﬁciary for two reasons. First of all it ensures that qualiﬁed users always have a
membership certiﬁcate, even in the face of a corrupt revocation manager. Secondly it allows us to present an alternative
solution that removes the update necessity when users are added. Normally when a user with exponent e is added, the
revocation manager computes a new value v by ve and hence all other users have to raise their private values to the
power e as well to keep track of the right root of v. However, the revocation manager might equally well update u by
u1/e and computing v1/e for the new group member. Since this does not change v, other users do not need to change
their respective B’s. Note however that this trick falls outside of the standard dynamic accumulator theory used by
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17], so we cannot fully copy their security proof. Moreover, this requires either that the
group manager can compute roots, or that the group manager already knows a predetermined set of roots for the initial
value of u, and it uses the corresponding e’s during the Join-protocol.
We have to introduce some security parameters and refer to the original work byAteniese et al. [2] for more details.
Following Brickell et al. [11], we provide recommendations for the parameters (in parentheses).We will need > 1 and
integers k (80) and lp (1024). Moreover, 1 (4258), 2 (4096), 1 (4422) and 2 (4260) will denote lengths that deﬁne
the intervals  = (21 − 22 , 21 + 22) and  = (21 − 22 , 21 + 22). Furthermore, we will need a cryptographic
hash function H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k for the non-interactive proofs of knowledge.
7.1. Setup protocol
Setup is run by the group manager in two different incarnations: one calledMJ running the Join protocol and the
other one responsible for revocationMR. The join manager is the most important one in the sense thatMJ should
remain uncorrupted to achieve soundness, whereasMR may be corrupted.
(1) ManagerMJ selects distinct primes p′ and q ′ of size lp, such that p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q ′ + 1 are primes. It
computes and publishes the modulus n=pq together with a proof that n is a safe RSA-modulus (see [1]). It keeps
the factorisation of n as private key.
We assume that hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → QR(n) is deﬁned as well. In the random oracle model, H can be
assumed to produce a distribution statistically close to the uniform one of generators of QR(n) and that different
calls to H produce independent and hence uncorrelated outcomes unless the calls are on the same input. In
particular, nothing will ‘leak’ about respective discrete logarithms, not even toMJ who knows the factorisation
of n.
(2) Manager MJ publishes random elements a, a0, g and h in QR(n), and it sets up an, initially empty, database
DB.
(3) ManagerMR chooses random elements u, f in QR(n), sets v = u and publishes u, v and f. It sets up, initially
empty, sets Eadd and Edel. For anonymity againstMR it is essential that f is uncorrelated to (g, h).
We denote the group’s public key by pk = (n, a, a0, g, h, u, v, f ) together with DB, Eadd, Edel, and denote MJ’s
private key by skM = p′. Note thatMR does not have a private key speciﬁc to the group signature scheme, although
it is implicitly understood to have a legally binding key outside the group signature scheme in order to sign its part of
the group public key (u, v, f ).
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7.2. Join protocol
This algorithm is based on the Join-protocol that is part of the group signature scheme by Ateniese et al. [2].
(1) User i and managerMJ engage in a two-party protocol, at the end of which the user knows x ∈  and the
manager knows ax mod n. The protocol is such that the user cannot inﬂuence the choice (or distribution) of x
and the manager learns nothing beyond ax mod n (this can be formalised [25]).
(2) The manager picks a prime e ∈  not yet in DB and computes A= (axa0)1/e mod n. It sends (A, e) to the user.
(3) The user checks that neitherA nor e already occurs in the database, that e is a prime in and thatAe=axa0 mod n.
If so, it returns (A, e) together with a legally binding signature on it incorporating (a, a0, n).
(4) ManagerMJ adds (A, e) to the database, together with user i’s identity and signature.
(5) ManagerMR checks that e is a prime in  that occurs only once in the database. If so, it adds e to Eadd, sets
B=v, sends B to the user, and updates the public key by v=ve mod n. In our variationMR leaves v unchanged,
updates u = u1/e and sends B = v1/e to the user.
During this protocol, a new group member i will obtain from the managers a private key ski = x and a membership
certiﬁcate (A, e, B) such thatAe=axa0 mod n andBe=v mod n. Note that the membership certiﬁcate is public: (A, e)
is part of the database and B can be recomputed based on u, v and the sets Eadd and Edel.
7.3. Revoke protocol
In case of a revocation of group member i with membership certiﬁcate (Ai, ei, Bi), managerMR has to compute a
new value for v being v1/ei mod n, add ei to Edel and publish the new v and Edel.
Although it seems revocation requires an ei th root computation onMR’s behalf, involving the factorisation of n,
the group manager can actually recompute v based on the ﬁxed element u and the sets Eadd and Edel. Note that the
workload for the group manager for revoking one group member is linear in the number of participants this way. If
MR does know the factorisation of n, it can obviously perform the root computation directly and independently of the
number of participants.
If it is undesired to giveMR access to the private key ofMJ, an efﬁcient solution is the introduction of a second
modulus n′ of which onlyMR knows the factorisation. In this case u, v, and f will be elements of QR(n′). Using a
different group for the revocation manager only marginally complicates the proofs needed in the Sign protocol (the
main tool is a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm with respect to different modulus, see e.g. [8,7]).
7.4. Update protocol
After a Registration protocol, group member i (using Eadd) has to replace Bi in its membership certiﬁcate by
Bei mod n, where e is a new entry of Eadd. However, if our variation is used whereMR updates u instead of v, old group
members do not have to update their key when new members join.
After a Revocation protocol revoking user i, each group member j = i (using Edel) has to replace the value Bj in
its certiﬁcate by Bbj va mod n where a and b are such that aej + bei = 1 and where ei is a new entry of Edel.
In either case, the user j always knows a pair (ej , Bj ) such that Bejj = v mod n.
7.5. Sign protocol
In the original scheme of Ateniese et al., the signer ﬁrst publishes T1 = Aigw mod n, T2 = hw mod n, and T3 =
gei hw mod n, where w is a randomly chosen value, followed by a proof of knowledge of ei, xi, w, and w′ = eiw such
that T e1 = axa0gw
′
, T2 = hw, T ei2 = hw
′
, and T3 = gei hw, all modulo n. The proof of knowledge includes range checks
on x and e, but does not involve the primality of e. The main tool is a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm in a
group of unknown order (see e.g. [14,8,7,25]).
Our ﬁrst observation is that publishing T3 and explicitly proving knowledge of w is actually superﬂuous in the above
scheme (or, for that matter, in a whole range of schemes derived from it). Our second observation is that T1 and T2
both seem necessary, even if opening of the signature based on knowledge of  = logg h is not required. Our third
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observation is that publishing H(T )x mod n will allow detectability, where T is the time frame. Finally, we remark that
including Bfw in the signature will show that the user is qualiﬁed (cf. [17]).
This leads us to the following signing algorithm for message m, time frame T and based on membership certiﬁcate
(A, e, x, B).
(1) The signer picks w at random modulo n, and computes
T1 = Agw mod n,
T2 = hw mod n,
T3 = Bfw mod n,
T4 = tx mod n,
where t = H(T ), as before.
(2) The signer proves knowledge of e ∈ , x ∈ , and existence of w′ (=ew) such that
T e1 = axa0gw
′
mod n,
T e2 = hw
′
mod n,
T e3 = vf w
′
mod n,
T4 = tx mod n,
where the message to be signed is hashed into the challenge.
The proof of knowledge is fairly standard, and its size is slightly larger than 6 log2 n bits.
7.6. Verify and match protocols
A veriﬁer can check the validity of a signature by simply verifying the proof of knowledge.
Moreover, everyone who has access to all signatures for a particular time frame can easily see if a user has signed
twice or more by observing the value of T4. The user cannot cheat (by using another value) because T4 is linked with
T1 by the proof of knowledge and the private key x.
7.7. Security of the proposed list signature scheme
In this section, we informally examine the security of our list signature scheme.
Correctness: The ﬁrst clause of correctness is satisﬁed because an honest user i will only sign a pair (A, e) if it
knows an x such that (A, e, x) is a valid certiﬁcate. Moreover, a user will only be classiﬁed as qualiﬁed if e ∈ Equal
and v = u
∏
e∈Equal e
, from which B satisfying Be = v can be efﬁciently reconstructed. Hence any honest qualiﬁed user
will have the knowledge to pass through the NIZK proof required for a signature (where we use completeness of this
proof).
The second clause of correctness is also satisﬁed, since the only way an adversary can cause detection is by posting
a signature for the same time frame with tx , including a proof of knowledge of a value x′ such that x′ = x modp′q ′
where x is the user’s private key. But if the adversary knows such an x′, it can also identify signatures from that user,
breaching anonymity.
Soundness:We claim that the list signature scheme is sound against attacks not involving the Join managerMJ. Note
thatMJ can always introduce ghost members that have valid certiﬁcates but that do not appear in the database. This
holds even if the revocation manager is not corrupted and uses a different group of order unknown toMJ, since the
ghost users can use e’s already in use by honest users. Soundness is based on the following reasoning:
(1) Without loss of generality we can assume that the adversary knows a value  = logh g and a value  = logh f ,
since knowledge of these values only helps the adversary.
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(2) If an adversary posts a valid signature (T1, T2, T3, T4), it also proves, by virtue of the soundness of the zero-
knowledge proof in the signature, that it knows e ∈  and x ∈  for which an w′ exists such that T e1 = axa0gw
′
,
T e2 = hw
′
, and T e3 = vf w
′
. But then (T −2 T1)
e = axa0 and (T −2 T3)e = v. Since we assume the adversary knows
 and , it can compute a valid membership certiﬁcate (A, e, x, B) based on any valid signature it issues. Note
that the random oracle model is used for the soundness of the NIZK-proof.
(3) By virtue of the proof of equality of x in T4 and x in the membership certiﬁcate, each certiﬁcate can be used only
once within the same time frame without triggering detection.
(4) Under the strong RSA assumption, the Join-protocol cannot be used to obtain more certiﬁcates than queried for
[2, Theorem 1].
(5) Under anonymity of the users (see below), the value x of honest users is unknown to the adversary, hence certiﬁcates
of honest users are of no avail.
(6) One cannot use e’s in use by honest users because of the security (under the strong RSA assumption) of the
dynamic accumulator used for group management [17].
Anonymity: First of all, if the Join-protocol is correctly implemented, it will only leak ax mod n (some care has to
be taken to shield the protocol against concurrent attacks).
In the random oracle model the proof of knowledge that is part of the signature can be proven statistically zero-
knowledge (note that concurrency is not an issue, since a signature is a one-round protocol). Hence all that leaks from a
signature is the quadruple (Agw, hw, Bf w, tx). An adversary that could distinguish anything about A or B would break
the semantic security of ElGamal encryption, which is hard under the decisional Difﬁe–Hellman assumption. Hence a
signature essentially only leaks tx . Luckily the problem of distinguishing the distribution (a, t1, t2, . . . , tl , ax, t1, ..., txl )
with a and t1, . . . , tl uniformly random inQR(n) and x in from the distribution of 2l+2 uniformly distributed elements
in QR(n) reduces to standard DDH.
7.8. Efﬁciency
The group’s public key consists of a 2048-bit modulus n and six elements of QR(n), taking in total 14 336 bits.
A signature involves the posting of four elements in QR(n) together with a proof of knowledge of about 3 elements
slightly bigger than n2. In total a signature can be expected to take about 23 250 bits. Hence for the schemes presented
in this work, at around 70 participants the large group scheme becomes more efﬁcient than the small group scheme.
We would like to point out though that recently more efﬁcient group signature schemes have appeared for large
groups, that can also be adapted to list signature schemes. In fact, the direct anonymous attestation scheme by Brickell
et al. [11] is already very close to a list signature scheme if the TPM and the host in their scheme are regarded as a single
user. On the downside we would like to note that presently all large group signature schemes seem to be based on the
Strong RSA assumption (and the DDH), whereas the small group schemes can be based on just a group in which the
DDH is hard, allowing groups over elliptic curves. Given the current track record of attacking the respective problems
[28], it is to be expected that the moduli for the large group schemes have to grow faster than the group sizes of the
elliptic curves, thus the break-even point can be expected to shift in favour of small group schemes.
8. Application to electronic voting
Some proposals for electronic voting schemes use blind signatures as a building block. In such schemes, each voter
is issued a single blind signature for use in a particular election. During the election, the voter uses its blind signature
to authenticate a vote, which needs to be submitted via an anonymous channel. The election result is determined by
collecting all submitted votes and accompanying blind signatures. The security of such voting schemes relies on trust
in the party that issues the blind signatures and the fact that blind signatures cannot be forged. Of course, each blind
signature should be accepted at most once to prevent voters from voting multiple times. Finally, ballot secrecy is
achieved since the blind signatures used to authenticate a vote do not reveal any information on the identity of the voter
who submitted it.
We note that list signatures can be used to replace blind signatures in such voting schemes. Instead of authenticating
a vote by means of a blind signature, a list signature is used, preserving the security and privacy properties of the voting
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scheme. A major advantage of the use of list signatures over blind signatures is that a voter does not need to get a blind
signature for each election in which the voter needs to take part. Another potential advantage is that the computational
complexity and storage complexity improves for the voters. In a list signature scheme, the storage for a user is O(1)
and the work for generating a signature is also O(1) (assuming a scheme for large groups). Also, there is no practical
limit on the number of signatures that can be produced by a user.
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